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The aim of this paper is threefold: (i) to investigate if there is a unique rational 
expectations equilibrium (REE) in the small open economy in Galí and Monacelli 
(2005) that is augmented with technical trading in the foreign exchange market; 
(ii) to investigate if the unique REE is adaptively learnable in a recursive least 
squares sense; and (iii) to investigate if the unique and adaptively learnable REE 
is desirable in an inflation rate targeting regime in the sense that a low and not too 
variable CPI inflation rate in equilibrium is achieved. The monetary authority is 
using a Taylor rule when setting the nominal interest rate, and we investigate 
numerically the properties of the model developed. A main conclusion is that the 
monetary authority should increase (decrease) the interest rate when the CPI 
inflation rate increases (decreases) and when the currency gets stronger (weaker) 
to have a desirable rule that is robust with respect to the degree of technical 
trading in the foreign exchange market. Thus, the value of the currency is a better 
response variable than the output gap in the most desirable parametrizations of the 
interest rate rule. 
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interest rate rule, robust monetary policy, technical trading 
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Heterogeeniset odotukset, uskomusten päivitys ja 
avoimen talouden robustit rahapolitiikan korkosäännöt 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 6/2007 
Mikael Bask – Carina Selander 




Tässä työssä tarkastellaan lähinnä kolmea kysymystä. Ensiksi tutkitaan, onko 
teknisellä valuuttamarkkinakaupalla täydennetyssä pienen avotalouden dynaami-
sessa jäykkien hintojen makromallissa löydettävissä yksikäsitteinen rationaalisten 
odotusten tasapaino. Tätä yksikäsitteisen tasapainon olemassaoloa koskevaa kysy-
mystä täydennetään seuraavaksi tasapainon adaptiiviseen opittavuuteen liittyvillä 
tarkasteluilla. Taloudenpitäjät päivittävät talouden liikelakia koskevia uskomuk-
siaan tilastollisin menetelmin, ja tasapainon opittavuudella tarkoitetaan tässä yh-
teydessä uskomusten yhtäläistymistä rationaalisten odotusten kanssa. Kolman-
neksi työssä tarkastellaan, onko yksikäsitteisellä ja adaptiivisesti opittavissa 
olevalla rationaalisten odotusten tasapainolla inflaatiotavoitteeseen perustuvan 
rahapolitiikan kannalta toivottavia ominaisuuksia eli, tarkemmin ilmaisten, onko 
hidas ja vähän vaihteleva kuluttajahintainflaatio sopusoinnussa tällaisen tasa-
painon kanssa. Keskuspankki käyttää nimelliskorkoa asettaessaan korkosääntöä, 
ja työssä käytetyn mallin ominaisuuksia tarkastellaan numeerisin menetelmin. 
Tutkimuksen päätuloksen mukaan keskuspankin tulisi nostaa korkotasoa, kun 
kuluttajahintainflaatio kiihtyy ja kotimaan valuutta vahvistuu, jotta keskuspankin 
käyttämä korkosääntö toimisi tehokkaasti teknisen valuuttamarkkinakaupan yleis-
tyessä. Tästä seuraa, että normaalin tuotantokuilun sijasta keskuspankin tulisi 
käyttää valuuttakurssia korkosäännössään koron muutospaineiden indikaattorina. 
 
Avainsanat: määrittyneisyys, ulkomaan valuutta, inflaatiotavoite, korkosääntö, 
robusti rahapolitiikka, tekninen kaupankäynti 
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Bakground During the last two decades, a new paradigm in monetary policy
has evolved. This paradigm concerns independent central banks, openness
and inﬂation rate targeting. In other words, monetary policy is conducted
by the central bank without political inﬂuence, with the purpose of creating
price-stability and credibility to evade the time-inconsistency problem. Further
on, monetary policy is conducted through interest rate managing with an
explicit target for the inﬂation rate. This new paradigm has been developed
a l m o s tw i t h o u ta n yg u i d a n c ef r o mt h ea c a d e m i cl i t e r a t u r e( s e ep . 3i n
Woodford, 2003). However, since this practise nowadays is established among
central banks of the industrialized countries, the literature within this area is
ﬂourishing.
In 1993, John B Taylor (1993) demonstrated that the monetary policy of
the Federal Reserve could be described by the following interest rate rule:
rt =0 .04 + 1.5(πt − 0.02) + 0.5(yt − y), (1.1)
where rt is the Federal Reserve’s operating target for the funds rate, πt is
the inﬂation rate according to the GDP deﬂator, yt is the logarithm of real
GDP, and y is the logarithm of potential real GDP. This kind of rule has
been the center of attention within the monetary policy literature since it was
p r e s e n t e da n di so f t e nr e f e r r e dt oa saT a y l o rr u l e . I np a r t i c u l a r ,t h eT a y l o r
rule in (1.1) prescribes setting an operating interest rate target in response to
the inﬂation rate and the (output) gap between the logarithm of real GDP and
the logarithm of potential real GDP.
The key question in the literature is whether this type of interest rate rule,
which does not incorporate a target path for the monetary aggregates, can
control the price level and create price-stability. In other words, the success
of this type of monetary policy rule hinges on the central bank’s ability to
shape market expectations of future interest rates, inﬂation rates and income
levels. It is, therefore, important for the central bank to commit to the rule,
be as transparent as possible in its decision making, and make the correct
policy-decisions as often as possible. Taylor (1999) also argues that since
the interest rate rule in (1.1) describes the Federal Reserve’s policy during a
successful period, one should adopt a rule like this in policy-making in which
the interest rate is set in response to the inﬂation rate and the output gap.
However, since most countries trade extensively with other countries, and,
therefore, should be considered as open economies, one might ask whether
some exchange rate index also should be included in the monetary policy rule.
Taylor (2001) does not think so, and the reason is that
“... rules that react directly to the exchange rate ... sometimes
work worse than policy rules that do not react directly to the
exchange rate” (p. 267, italics added).
Instead, Taylor (2001) argues that the indirect eﬀe c tt h a te x c h a n g er a t e sh a v e
on monetary policy, via its eﬀect on the inﬂation rate and the output gap, is
to prefer since it results in fewer and less erratic changes in the interest rate.
7Our model In this paper, two types of Taylor rules are embedded in
a theoretical framework consisting of a dynamic IS-type equation, a new
Keynesian Phillips curve, and a parity condition at the international asset
market. The ﬁrst rule is a contemporaneous data speciﬁcation of the output
gap, the inﬂa t i o nr a t ea n dt h ec h a n g ei na ne x c h a n g er a t ei n d e x( t h a t ,i nt h e
analysis below, consists of a single exchange rate), whereas the second rule is
a contemporaneous expectations speciﬁcation of the same variables. Further
on, technical trading is incorporated into the foreign exchange market in the
form of extrapolation of trends in the exchange rate index, and the reason is
that several questionnaire surveys made at currency markets around the world
conﬁrm that technical trading, or chartism, is extensively used in currency
trade.
Examples of questionnaire surveys include Cheung and Chinn (2001), who
conducted a survey at the US market; Lui and Mole (1998), who conducted a
survey at the Hong Kong market; Menkhoﬀ (1997) and (1998), who conducted
a survey at the German market; Oberlechner (2001), who conducted surveys
at the markets in Frankfurt, London, Vienna and Zurich; and Taylor and
Allen (1992), who conducted a survey at the London market. An extensive
exploration of the trading behavior at the foreign exchange market is also found
in Oberlechner (2004) that is based on surveys conducted at the European and
the North American markets.
Thus, we include the change in an exchange rate index into the monetary
authority’s interest rate rule, even though Taylor (2001) claims that this kind
of rule might worsen the outcome of monetary policy. However, as also is
argued in Taylor (2001), more research is needed to investigate whether this
claim holds in all types of models, and our contribution to the literature is
to examine to what extent monetary policy is and should be aﬀected when
currency trade is partly driven by chartism.
Our approach It is well-known that models in economics and ﬁnance, in
which agents have rational expectations regarding some of the variables in the
model, may exhibit a multiplicity of rational expectations equilibria (REE).
This is problematic. For instance, without imposing additional restrictions into
such a model, it is not known in advance which of the REE that the agents
will coordinate on, if there will be any coordination at all. To give an example,
the eﬀects of monetary policy is not known beforehand: is it the case that the
agents will coordinate on an equilibrium that has undesirable properties, like
at o oh i g hi n ﬂation rate, or an equilibrium with a low inﬂation rate?
Therefore, after augmenting the small open economy in Galí and Monacelli
(2005) with technical trading in the foreign exchange market, we explore for
which parameter values we have Taylor rules that give rise to determinacy, ie,
a unique REE. Further on, which is a self-evident fact, but often neglected
in the literature, is that a unique REE is not the same as a desirable REE.
For this reason, we check whether the REE is desirable in an inﬂation rate
targeting regime. In other words, is the unique inﬂation rate low enough and
not too variable in equilibrium?
In between the questions on determinacy and the desirability of the
inﬂation rate in equilibrium, we investigate if the REE is adaptively learnable
8in recursive least squares sense. The reason is that rational expectations
is a rather strong assumption since it assumes that agents often have an
outstanding capacity when it comes to deriving equilibrium outcomes of the
variables in a model. This assumption has, therefore, in the more recent
literature, been complemented by an analysis of the possible convergence to the
REE (see Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for an introduction to this literature).
To be more precise, it is assumed that expectations are formed by a
correctly speciﬁed model, ie, a model that nests the REE, but without having
perfect knowledge about the parameter values in the model. However, using
past and current values of all variables in the model, the parameter values are
learned over time since the beliefs are revised as new information is gained.
T h u s ,t h eq u e s t i o ni nf o c u si st h i s :w i l lt h ea g e n t sl e a r nt h ep a r a m e t e rv a l u e s
in the model that corresponds to the unique REE?
Even though questionnaire surveys made at foreign exchange markets
around the world demonstrate that technical trading techniques are used
extensively in currency trade, it is not obvious to what extent these techniques
are used at each moment in time. Clearly, the aforementioned surveys reveal
an inverse relationship between the extent of chartism and the time horizon in
currency trade, but the exact proportion of technical trading is still not known
when conducting monetary policy. Therefore, to ﬁnd robust parametrizations
of the Taylor rules, the desirable properties of a rule should be relatively
unaﬀected by the degree of technical trading in the foreign exchange market.
Finally, since the model developed is too large for theoretical analysis,
we have to illustrate our ﬁndings numerically.1 Speciﬁcally, we use calibrated
values of the structural parameters in our model that are found in other papers
within this research area (see Bullard and Mitra, 2002, and references therein).
Relation to the literature To slightly simplify the picture, there are two
s t r a n d so fl i t e r a t u r et h a te x p l o r et h ee ﬀects of monetary policy in the new
Keynesian framework. In the ﬁrst strand of literature, an optimal policy rule
for the monetary authority is derived via optimization of a welfare function, but
the conditions for determinacy and adaptive learnability of the REE are often
neglected (see, eg, Galí and Monacelli, 2005). In the second strand of literature,
the focus is on ﬁnding parametrizations of Taylor rules that give rise to a
unique REE that also is adaptively learnable in recursive least squares sense.
However, the interest rate rules that satisfy these criteria are not evaluated
using a welfare function as the metric (see, eg, Bullard and Mitra, 2002).
Our paper ﬁlls the gap between the two aforementioned papers since we,
like Bullard and Mitra (2002), search for Taylor rules that are associated
with a unique and an adaptively learnable inﬂation rate in equilibrium,
but also, like Galí and Monacelli (2005), evaluate this equilibrium using a
loss-function. However, a discrepancy between our paper and papers in which
optimal monetary policy rules are derived is that we restrict the search for
the most desirable rules among those rules that give rise to determinacy and
adaptive learnability of the REE. The loss-function that we make use of in the
analysis concerns the expected inﬂation rate and the conditional volatility of
the inﬂation rate in equilibrium.
1MATLAB routines for this purpose are available on request from the authors.
9In addition to our paper, Bullard and Schaling (2006) also ﬁll the gap
between the two aforementioned strands of literature, but in a two-country
setting. They, however, do not include an exchange rate index in any of the
Taylor rules investigated. Llosa and Tuesta (2006) explore the determinacy and
learnability requirements for monetary policy using the small open economy
in Galí and Monacelli (2005), and they include the change in the nominal
exchange rate in some of the examined interest rate rules. All these authors,
however, disregard from technical trading in the foreign exchange market, like
all authors within this area do. A closely related exception is Honkapohja and
Mitra (2006) who investigate the case with heterogeneous agents in a closed
economy.
Two surveys of the literature that focus on determinacy and learnability
requirements for monetary policy in a closed economy are Bullard (2006) and
Evans and Honkapohja (2003), and they also discuss optimal monetary policy
rules.
If we do not restrict our discussion to monetary policy in the new Keynesian
framework, Frankel and Froot (1986) implemented fundamental and technical
analyses into an exchange rate model, and they were among the ﬁrst that
utilized this setup when focusing at the foreign exchange market. Brock and
Hommes (1997) provide a model with an evolutionary switching between a
costly but sophisticated forecasting strategy, and a free but simple rule of
thumb strategy. We make use of Frankel and Froot’s (1986) setup in our
model, but postpone the incorporation of an evolutionary switching between
strategies for future research.
For a literature survey on heterogeneous agent models in economics
and ﬁnance, see Hommes (2006), and for an introduction to exchange rate
determination in a behavioral ﬁnance framework, see De Grauwe and Grimaldi
(2006).
Our main ﬁnding Contrary to what Taylor (2001) claims, we ﬁnd
parametrizations of interest rate rules with robust and desirable properties
that include the change in an exchange rate index. Further on, these rules do
not include the output gap, which might be an advantage since it comes closer
to the reality of central banking. To be more speciﬁc ,d u et od a t ar e v i s i o n s ,i t
is often the case that policy-makers do not have the correct information on a
variable such as real GDP when needed. This is even more true when it comes
to a variable such as potential real GDP.
Of course, one should not take our ﬁnding that the Taylor rule should
include the change in an exchange rate index to be robust and desirable too
literally since this result relies on calibrated values of the structural parameters
in the model. Instead, our message is this, if we travesty the quote by Taylor
(2001):
Monetary policy rules that react directly to the exchange rate, or
an exchange rate index, sometimes work better than policy rules
that do not react directly to such quantities.
10It is self-evident that future research should explore the robustness of our
ﬁnding.
Ac a v e a t There are not too many papers that incorporate chartism in a
foreign exchange model, and we believe there are two reasons for this. The
ﬁrst reason is that many researchers do not believe that currency traders using
technical analysis can survive in the market, and the second reason is that
even if some researchers are aware of the use of chartism in currency trade,
most of them argue that it is of uttermost importance to explain why these
t r a d e r ss u r v i v ei nt h em a r k e t .
We are sympathetic to this standpoint, which can be traced back to
Friedman (1953), but we also believe that this may be a hindrance to a better
understanding of the eﬀects of technical trading in the foreign exchange market
since it is not easy to develop a theoretical model that satisfactorily explain
human behavior at the currency market or at any ﬁnancial asset market.
De Long et al (1990) is an example that contradicts Friedman’s (1953)
claim that non-rational traders cannot survive in the market in the long-run.
In their model, noise traders, having erroneous beliefs, will bear more risk
than risk averse and rational traders, meaning that the former traders may
earn more money than the latter traders, and, therefore, may survive in the
market.
Outline of the paper The theoretical framework is outlined in Section 2,
whereas the search for robust Taylor rules with desirable properties is in focus
in Section 3. The paper is concluded in Section 4, and the Appendix contains
technical details.
2 Theoretical framework
Our theoretical framework consists of three parts: (i) the small open economy
in Galí and Monacelli (2005), which is our baseline model; (ii) equations that
describe the trading behavior at the foreign exchange market; and (iii) a Taylor
rule for the monetary authority. Due to the ﬁndings in Bullard and Mitra
(2002), two types of Taylor rules are investigated: (i) a contemporaneous
data speciﬁcation; and (ii) a contemporaneous expectations speciﬁcation.
Speciﬁcally, these two types of Taylor rules have appealing properties in a
closed economy, and our aim is to investigate if these rules still have appealing
properties in an open economy. The three parts are outlined in Sections
2.1—2.3, respectively.
2.1 Baseline model
Basically, the Galí and Monacelli (2005) model is a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model with imperfect competition and nominal rigidities. In their
model, the world economy is represented by a continuum of inﬁnitely small
economies, meaning that since each economy is of measure zero, its policy
11decisions do not have any impact on the rest of the world. Consequently,
there is no room for strategic behavior in monetary policy-making. It is
also assumed that the economies share identical household preferences, ﬁrm
technology and market structure, while diﬀerent economies are subject to
correlated productivity shocks. Finally, ﬁrms set prices in a staggered fashion
as in Calvo (1983).
After extensive derivations, the Galí and Monacelli (2005) model can be











where xt is the output gap, rt is the nominal interest rate, πH,t is the domestic
inﬂation rate, and rrt is the natural rate of interest. To be more speciﬁc, the
output gap is the deviation of output from its natural level, where the latter is
output in the absence of nominal rigidities. The domestic inﬂation rate is the
rate of change in the index of domestic goods prices, and the natural rate of
interest is the real interest rate that is consistent with output’s natural level.
Finally, the superscript e denotes expectations. (In Section 2.2, we will discuss
how expectations are formed in the model.)
For our purpose, (2.1) is not in an appropriate form since there are no
expected exchange rate terms in the equations. These terms are necessary
when modeling the trading behavior at the foreign exchange market. It is,
however, possible to use the following equations, which are derived in Galí and
Monacelli (2005), to rewrite (2.1) into a suitable form
½
πt = πH,t + δ∆st
st = et + p∗
t − pH,t
, (2.2)
where πt is the CPI inﬂation rate, st is the terms of trade, et is the nominal
exchange rate (or, more broadly, an exchange rate index), p∗
t is the index of
foreign goods prices, and pH,t is the index of domestic goods prices. Speciﬁcally,
the terms of trade is the relative price of the home country’s import goods in
terms of its domestically produced goods, and the CPI inﬂa t i o nr a t ei st h er a t e
of change in the index of goods prices. Thus, the diﬀerence between the two
measures of the inﬂation rate, πH,t and πt, is that the former measure is based
on all prices for domestically produced goods, whereas the latter measure is
based on all prices within the home country, imported goods included. CPI is
also an abbreviation for consumer price index. Finally, the asterisk denotes a
foreign quantity.
Now, if we rewrite the equations in (2.1) with help of those in (2.2), we get





























where the superscript e,m denotes (aggregated) expectations at the foreign
exchange market. The third equation in the baseline model, which also is
2See the Appendix for the derivation of (2.3).







Thus, (2.4) is a parity condition at the international asset market. Finally, we
assume that the natural rate of interest is governed by the following stochastic
process
rrt = ρrrt−1 + εt, (2.5)
where 0 ≤ ρ<1 is the serial correlation in the process, and εt ∈ IID(0,σ 2
ε).
To sum up, (2.3)—(2.5) is the complete baseline model that will be augmented
with equations that describe the trading behavior at the foreign exchange
market as well as a Taylor rule for the monetary authority. Note that the
stochastic process in (2.5) also is assumed to hold in Bullard and Mitra (2002).
At this stage, let us say a few words about the structural parameters
in our baseline model. β>0 is the discount factor that is used when the
representative household in the home country maximizes a discounted sum
of instantaneous utilities derived from consumption and leisure. δ ∈ [0,1] is
the share of consumption in the home country allocated to imported goods,
meaning that δ is an index of openness of the economy. For example, the
equations in (2.3) reduces to those in Bullard and Mitra (2002) when δ =0
since the home country is a closed economy in this case.
The other two parameters in the model, α and γ, are not that easy
to interpret since they are functions of structural parameters in the Galí
and Monacelli (2005) model. Shortly, α depends on four parameters: (i)
the openness index, δ; (ii) the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
consumption; (iii) the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
goods in consumption; and (iv) the elasticity of substitution between foreign
goods in consumption. Moreover, γ depends on α as well as three other
parameters: (i) the discount factor, β; (ii) the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in labor supply; and (iii) the share of ﬁrms that set (new) prices
in each time period (see Calvo, 1983).
Since we investigate the properties of the model developed numerically,
we do not need to emphasize the exact relationships between the structural
parameters in our baseline model and the structural parameters in the Galí
and Monacelli (2005) model. Of course, to fully grasp the micro-foundations in
the baseline model and their relationships with the dynamic IS-type equation
and the new Keynesian Phillips curve in (2.3) as well as the UIP condition in
(2.4), it is necessary to consult Galí and Monacelli (2005).
2.2 Trading behavior at the foreign exchange market
There are two types of traders in the foreign exchange market; (i) agents who
use chartism, or technical analysis, in their trade, meaning that they utilize
past exchange rates to detect patterns that are extrapolated into the future;
and (ii) agents who use fundamental analysis in their trade, meaning that they
13have rational expectations regarding the next time period’s exchange rate, or,
as in our model, the next time period’s change in the exchange rate. Thus,
these agents know that there are agents who use technical trading techniques
in currency trade, and they take this into account when forming their exchange
rate expectations.




t+1 = ∆et, (2.6)
ie, the chartists expect that the nominal exchange rate will continue to increase
(decrease) in the next time period, if it has increased (decreased) in the current
t i m ep e r i o d . T ob em o r es p e c i ﬁc, if the exchange rate increased (decreased)
between time periods t − 1 and t, the chartists believe that the exchange rate
also will increase (decrease) between time periods t and t +1 .M o r e o v e r , t o
keep the structural parameters in the model developed as few as possible, it is
assumed that these two consecutive increases (decreases) in the exchange rate
are of the same size. Finally, the superscript e,c denotes chartist expectations.
Then, if we move on to the fundamentalists, it is assumed that they have






which means that the expected change in the exchange rate is equal to the
mathematically expected change in the exchange rate, conditioned on all
information available to this type of currency trader. This information includes
the structure of the complete model as well as past and current values of all
variables in the model, meaning that the dating of expectations is time period
t. (However, as will be discussed in Section 3.2.2, when a contemporaneous
expectations speciﬁcation of the Taylor rule is used by the monetary authority,
we assume that the dating of expectations is time period t − 1.) Finally, the
superscript e,f denotes fundamentalist expectations.
The expected exchange rate terms that appear in (2.3)—(2.4) are aggregated
expectations at the foreign exchange market. Speciﬁcally, these expectations





t+1 +( 1− ω)∆e
e,f
t+1 (2.8)
= ω∆et +( 1− ω)∆e
e
t+1,
where ω ∈ [0,1] is the proportion of chartists in currency trade. Thus,
aggregated expectations are a weighted average of the current change in the
exchange rate and the next time period’s mathematically expected change in
the exchange rate. Consequently, as long as there are chartists present in the
foreign exchange market, aggregated expectations do not coincide with rational
expectations.
2.3 Taylor rules
We will investigate the properties of the complete model using two
speciﬁcations of the Taylor rule: (i) a contemporaneous data speciﬁcation
14of the rule; and (ii) a contemporaneous expectations speciﬁcation of the rule.
Moreover, since the nominal exchange rate or the change in this exchange rate
may aﬀect the economy’s outcome in equilibrium, a term including the latter
variable is included in both types of rules
rt = ζc + ζxxt + ζππt + ζe∆et, (2.9)
and







where also a constant has been added. (In Section 3.3.1, it will be shown that
this constant is equal to the foreign nominal interest rate.) Thus, in the Taylor
rule in (2.10), the monetary authority has rational expectations.
3 A unique and desirable REE that is learnable?
Now, after having completed the description of our theoretical framework, we
will investigate the properties of the model developed: (i) is there a unique
REE in the model?; (ii) is the unique REE characterized by recursive least
squares learnability?; and (iii) is the unique and adaptively learnable REE
desirable in an inﬂation rate targeting regime in the sense that the inﬂation
rate is low enough and not too variable in equilibrium? All three questions
will be answered, for both speciﬁcations of the Taylor rule in (2.9)—(2.10), in
Sections 3.1—3.3, respectively.
3.1 Determinacy
Let us begin with the question if there are any parametrizations of the Taylor
r u l e si n( 2 . 9 ) — ( 2 . 1 0 )t h a tg i v er i s et oau n i q u eC P Ii n ﬂation rate in equilibrium.
3.1.1 Contemporaneous data in the Taylor rule
If the Taylor rule in (2.9) is used when the monetary authority is setting
the nominal interest rate, meaning that they respond to current data of the
output gap, the CPI inﬂation rate and change in the nominal exchange rate,
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Thus, to have a unique and stable REE, all three eigenvalues of the following
coeﬃc i e n tm a t r i xm u s tb ei n s i d et h eu n i tc i r c l es i n c ext, πt and ∆et are free
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⎦.
However, deriving necessary and suﬃcient conditions for determinacy is not
meaningful for practical reasons since these expressions would be too large
and cumbersome to interpret. Consequently, we adopt the strategy in Bullard
and Mitra (2002), and illustrate our ﬁndings for determinacy using calibrated
values of the structural parameters.
To be more speciﬁc, the following parameter values, or range of values, are
used in the analysis that are the same values as in Bullard and Mitra (2002)
½
α = 1
0.157,β =0 .99,γ =0 .024,δ =0 .2,
ρ =0 .35, 0 ≤ ζx ≤ 4, 0 ≤ ζπ ≤ 10, −5 ≤ ζe ≤ 5. (3.3)
Of course, the parameters δ, ω and ζe do not appear in Bullard and Mitra
(2002) since their model is for a closed economy. The index of openness of the
economy is δ =0 .2. However, to perform a sensitivity analysis of the numerical
ﬁndings, we will also investigate the case when this index is δ =0 .4.4 In the
former case, the index is slightly larger than the import/GDP ratio in the US,
and in the latter case, which is the parameter setting in Galí and Monacelli
(2005), the index corresponds roughly to the import/GDP ratio in Canada
and Sweden.
In all ﬁgures below, the regions in the parameter space of (ω,ζx,ζπ,ζe)
for which we have a unique REE are shown. Speciﬁcally, since ω and ζx are
given, it is the combinations of ζπ and ζe that are in the light areas in the
ﬁgures that give rise to determinacy. In Figure 1, there is no technical trading
3See the Appendix for the derivation of (3.1).
4Detailed results are available on request from the authors.
16in the foreign exchange market (ie, ω =0 ), meaning that all currency trade
is guided by fundamental analysis, and the monetary authority does not take
into account the output gap when setting the interest rate (ie, ζx =0 ).5
























































Determinacy-learnable region (light area) for the contemporaneous data specification
of the Taylor rule when the output gap reaction is 0 and there is 0 percent chartism
Figure 1
In Figures 2a—b, the proportion of chartists in currency trade has increased to
25 per cent, meaning that 75 per cent of the trade is guided by fundamental
analysis, and the parameter value in the Taylor rule that describes the output
gap reaction is ζx =0and ζx =2 , respectively.
5To keep the number of ﬁgures in the paper at a minimum, the regions in the ﬁgures are
not only the regions for determinacy, but also the regions for adaptive learnability. Thus, as
also will be clear in Section 3.2.1, when there is unique REE, the agents that use fundamental
analysis, which also includes the monetary authority, will learn this REE.
























































Determinacy-learnable region (light area) for the contemporaneous data specification 
of the Taylor rule when the output gap reaction is 0 and there is 25 percent chartism
Figure 2a
























































Determinacy-learnable region (light area) for both specifications of the Taylor
rule when the output gap reaction is 2 and there is 25 percent chartism        
Figure 2b
18A visible result in Figures 2a—b is that the region for a unique REE decreases
when the monetary authority reacts stronger to the output gap. This is also
true when there is no chartism in currency trade, even though we do not show
this result explicitly (since there are no determinacy regions for ζx ≥ 2,w h i c h
also is true for ζx =4when ω =0 .25). Moreover, if we compare Figure 1 and
Figure 2a, the determinacy region is larger when there is technical trading in
the foreign exchange market.
In Figures 3a—c, half of the trade in the foreign exchange market is driven
by technical analysis, whereas in Figures 4a—c, chartism is used in 75 per cent
of the trade. Finally, in Figures 5a—c, all trade in foreign exchange is based on
technical analysis, meaning that no trade is guided by fundamental analysis.
In all these ﬁgures, the parameter value that describes the output gap reaction
is ζx =0 , ζx =2and ζx =4 , respectively.
























































Determinacy-learnable region (light area) for the contemporaneous data specification 
of the Taylor rule when the output gap reaction is 0 and there is 50 percent chartism
Figure 3a
























































Determinacy-learnable region (light area) for both specifications of the Taylor
rule when the output gap reaction is 2 and there is 50 percent chartism        
Figure 3b
























































Determinacy-learnable region (light area) for both specifications of the Taylor
rule when the output gap reaction is 4 and there is 50 percent chartism        
Figure 3c
























































Determinacy-learnable region (light area) for the contemporaneous data specification 
of the Taylor rule when the output gap reaction is 0 and there is 75 percent chartism
Figure 4a
























































Determinacy-learnable region (light area) for both specifications of the Taylor
rule when the output gap reaction is 2 and there is 75 percent chartism        
Figure 4b
























































Determinacy-learnable region (light area) for both specifications of the Taylor
rule when the output gap reaction is 4 and there is 75 percent chartism        
Figure 4c
























































Determinacy-learnable region (light area) for the contemporaneous data specification  
of the Taylor rule when the output gap reaction is 0 and there is 100 percent chartism
Figure 5a
























































Determinacy-learnable region (light area) for both specifications of the Taylor
rule when the output gap reaction is 2 and there is 100 percent chartism       
Figure 5b
























































Determinacy-learnable region (light area) for both specifications of the Taylor
rule when the output gap reaction is 4 and there is 100 percent chartism       
Figure 5c
23When at least half of the trade in the foreign exchange market is driven by
technical analysis, the region for a unique REE increases when the monetary
authority reacts stronger to the output gap, which is in contrast with the result
in Figures 2a—b. Moreover, given the output gap reaction in the Taylor rule,
the determinacy region gets larger when the proportion of chartists in currency
trade increases (even if it seems that the size of the regions are the same in
Figure 4c and Figure 5c).
What is the intuition behind the result that an increase in technical trading
induces a larger determinacy region? There is a similar result in Bullard and
Mitra (2006) who investigate the conditions for determinacy (and learnability
that we will discuss in Section 3.2.1) in a closed economy like the one in
Bullard and Mitra (2002), where the monetary authority uses a Taylor rule
that is augmented with a term that includes the previous time period’s nominal
interest rate to have policy inertia. Bullard and Mitra (2006) conclude that
policy inertia helps to alleviate the problem with a multiplicity of REE, and
the similarity with our model is that an increase in chartism is a form of
increased inertia since there is a larger emphasize on the current exchange rate
change instead of the next time period’s (mathematically) expected exchange
rate change.
We will restrict our discussion about the ﬁndings in the ﬁgures to the results
previously mentioned, and the reason is that we save the conclusions till after
we have investigated the robustness and desirability of a speciﬁcR E Ei nt h e
perspective of an inﬂation rate targeting regime. It might, for example, be
tempting to conclude that the monetary authority should not react to exchange
rate changes, if the reaction to the output gap is strong enough and at least
half of the trade in foreign exchange is based on chartism (that is a reliable
assumption according to questionnaire surveys). However, as will be clear in
Section 3.3.1, it is not a favorable approach to restrict the parameter ζe in the
Taylor rule to 0 s i n c et h e r ea r es e v e r a lp a r a m e t r i z a t i o n so ft h er u l et h a tg i v e
rise to a better outcome in equilibrium in terms of the expected inﬂation rate
and the conditional volatility of the inﬂation rate when ζe < 0.
Sensitivity analysis When the index of openness of the economy increases
from δ =0 .2 to δ =0 .4,n o n eo ft h eﬁndings are aﬀected. That is, when at
least half of the trade in the currency market is driven by technical analysis,
the determinacy region increases when the monetary authority reacts stronger
to the output gap, whereas the opposite is true when less than half of the
trade is driven by chartism. Moreover, given the output gap reaction in the
Taylor rule, the determinacy region gets larger when the proportion of chartists
in currency trade increases. Finally, since we will learn in Section 3.3.1 that
robust and desirable Taylor rules do not include a reaction to the output gap,
we observe that the determinacy region is smaller when the economy is more
open when ζx =0 .
243.1.2 Contemporaneous expectations in the Taylor rule
If the Taylor rule in (2.10) is used when the monetary authority is setting the
nominal interest rate, meaning that they respond to current expectations of
the output gap, the CPI inﬂation rate and change in the nominal exchange
rate, the complete model in (2.3)—(2.5), (2.8) and (2.10) can be written in
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The dating of current expectations in (3.4) is time period t−1, meaning that
the monetary authority has rational expectations regarding the variables in
the interest rate rule, conditioned on all information available in the previous
time period.











0 + ²t. (3.5)
where ²t is a vector with error terms. Consequently, to have a unique and
stable REE, all three eigenvalues of the same coeﬃcient matrix as in Section
3.1.1 must be inside the unit circle since xt, πt and ∆et a r ef r e e( s e e( 3 . 2 ) ) . 7
Therefore, we refer to Figures 1-5 and the discussion around them for the
regions in the parameter space of (ω,ζx,ζπ,ζe) for which we have a unique
inﬂation rate in equilibrium.8
Sensitivity analysis Obviously, we get exactly the same results when
increasing the index of openness of the economy from δ =0 .2 to δ =0 .4
as when increasing the same index when a contemporaneous data speciﬁcation
o ft h eT a y l o rr u l ei su s e db yt h em o n e t a r ya u t h o r i t y .T h i si sb e c a u s et h es a m e
coeﬃcient matrix determines the conditions for determinacy for both types of
interest rate rules (see (3.2)).
6See the Appendix for the derivation of (3.4).
7See the Appendix for the derivation of this result.
8That is, the regions in Figures 1—5 are the determinacy regions when a contemporaneous
expectations speciﬁcation of the Taylor rule is used, even if it is written ‘contemporaneous
data speciﬁcation of the Taylor rule’ in some of the ﬁgures (see Figure 1, Figure 2a, Figure
3a, Figure 4a and Figure 5a). In fact, it will turn out in Section 3.2.2 that there are
parametrizations of the contemporaneous expectations speciﬁcation of the interest rate rule
that give rise to a unique REE that is not adaptively learnable.
253.2 Least squares learning
The assumption in (2.7) is that when fundamental analysis is used in currency
trade, the agents have rational expectations in the sense that the expected
change in the exchange rate is equal to the mathematically expected change
in the exchange rate, conditioned on all information available to the currency
trader. Thus, since this information not only includes past and current values
of all variables in the model, but also a perfect knowledge about the structure
of the model, rational expectations is a rather strong assumption. This
assumption has, therefore, in the more recent literature, been complemented
by an analysis of the possible convergence to the REE.
It is assumed that expectations are formed by a correctly speciﬁed model,
ie, a model that nests the REE, but without having perfect knowledge about
the parameter values in the model. However, using past and (depending on
the dating of expectations) current values of all variables in the model, the
parameter values are learned over time since the beliefs are revised as new
information is gained. To be more precise, we will examine if the unique REE
is characterized by recursive least squares learnability. But since expectational
stability, or E-stability, implies learnability (see, eg, Evans and Honkapohja,
2001), the focus in the analysis will be on E-stability. This is because the latter
concept is easier to handle mathematically.
When there is a unique REE in the model, we make use of the minimal state
variable (MSV) solution, which is the solution of a linear diﬀerence equation
that depends linearly on a set of variables such that there does not exist a
solution that depends linearly on a smaller set of variables (see McCallum,
1983). This is also the approach taken in Bullard and Mitra (2002).
Finally, recall that the agents that use technical analysis do not learn
anything since they use a mechanical rule in their trade in foreign exchange.
3.2.1 Contemporaneous data in the Taylor rule
Let us start with the contemporaneous data speciﬁcation of the interest rate
rule as it is presented in (2.9).
First, using matrices and vectors, the model in (3.1) can be written as
follows
Ξ · yt = Π + Σ · y
e
t+1 + Υ · rrt, (3.6)
where yt =[ xt,π t,∆et]
0 is the state of the economy. A suggested MSV solution
of the model in (3.6) is, therefore
yt = b Θ + b Λ · rrt, (3.7)
where b Θ and b Λ are parameter vectors to be determined with the method of
undetermined coeﬃcients. Hence, calculate the mathematically expected state
o ft h ee c o n o m yi nt h en e x tt i m ep e r i o d
y
e
t+1 = b Θ + b Λ · rr
e
t+1 (3.8)
= b Θ + b Λ · ρrrt,
26where (2.5) is used in the second step in (3.8), and the dating of expectations
is time period t. Thereafter, substitute (3.8) into the model in (3.6)
Ξ · yt = Π + Σ ·
³
b Θ + b Λ · ρrrt
´
+ Υ · rrt, (3.9)
or, if solved for the contemporaneous values of the model’s variables
yt = Ξ
−1 · Π + Ξ
−1 · Σ ·
³
b Θ + b Λ · ρrrt
´
+ Ξ
−1 · Υ · rrt (3.10)
= Ξ
−1 · Π + Γ ·
³
b Θ + b Λ · ρrrt
´
+ Ξ
−1 · Υ · rrt
= Ξ
−1 · Π + Γ · b Θ +
³




where Γ = Ξ−1 ·Σ. Finally, by comparing the parameters in (3.7) and (3.10),
we can solve for the MSV solution
yt =( I − Γ)
−1 · Ξ
−1 · Π +( I − Γ · ρ)
−1 · Ξ
−1 · Υ · rrt, (3.11)
since
(
b Θ = Ξ−1 · Π + Γ · b Θ
b Λ = Γ · b Λ · ρ + Ξ−1 · Υ
, (3.12)
where I is the identity matrix.
Now, is the MSV solution in (3.11) characterized by recursive least squares
learnability? To have a REE that is learnable, the parameter values in the
perceived law of motion (PLM) of the economy have to converge to the
parameter values in the economy’s actual law of motion (ALM) (see, eg, Evans
and Honkapohja, 2001). In fact, the suggested MSV solution in (3.7) is also
the PLM of the economy (which is emphasized by the ‘hat’-symbol since Θ
and Λ are parameter vectors that are estimated), and the solution in (3.10) is
t h eA L Mo ft h ee c o n o m y .
To be more precise, to have the ALM of the economy, a possibly
non-rational forecast of the next time period’s state of the economy should
be substituted into the model in (3.6) allowing for non-rational expectations.
However, since the mathematical expression in (3.10) would not be aﬀected
by this substitution, (3.10) is also the ALM of the economy. (In Section
3.2.2, when a contemporaneous expectations speciﬁcation of the Taylor rule is
used by the monetary authority, we will partly focus the presentation on the
derivation of the economy’s ALM.)
Observe that there is a mapping from the parameter values in the PLM to








Ξ−1 · Π + Γ · b Θ
Γ · b Λ · ρ + Ξ−1 · Υ
!
, (3.13)




















Ξ−1 · Π + Γ · b Θ








27where τ is ‘artiﬁcial’ time. Then, the MSV solution in (3.11) is E-stable, if
the parameter vectors b Θ and b Λ are locally asymptotically stable under (3.14).
This is also the case if all eigenvalues of the following matrixes have negative















/∂b Λ = Γ · ρ − I
. (3.15)
Since 0 ≤ ρ<1, we can limit our attention to the ﬁrst row in (3.15).
It is clear that when there is a unique REE and the state of the economy is in
t h en e i g h b o r h o o do ft h eR E E ,t h ea g e n t st h a tu s ef u n d a m e n t a la n a l y s i s ,w h i c h
also includes the monetary authority, will learn this REE. To see this result
explicitly, note that the characteristic equation for the determinacy problem
is (see Section 3.1.1)
|Γ − λd · I| =0 , (3.16)
where λd is the eigenvalue (that has three solutions), and that the characteristic
equation for the learnability problem is
|Γ − I − λl · I| = (3.17)
|Γ − (1 + λl) · I| =0 ,
where λl is the eigenvalue (that also has three solutions). Thus
Re(λl)=R e( λd − 1), (3.18)
which means that when λd is inside the unit circle, λl has a negative real part.
Therefore, we refer to Figures 1—5 and the discussion around them for the
regions in the parameter space of (ω,ζx,ζπ,ζe) for which we have a unique
and an adaptively learnable inﬂa t i o nr a t ei ne q u i l i b r i u m .B ea w a r et h a te v e n
though there is a REE that is adaptively learnable in recursive least squares
sense, this REE does not have to be unique.
It is not easy to give the intuition behind the result that an increase in
technical trading induces a larger learnability region. However, there is a
similar result in Bullard and Mitra (2006) that we discussed in Section 3.1.1.
Speciﬁcally, policy inertia not only induces a larger determinacy region in their
model, it also induces a larger learnability region. Thus, since chartism is a
form of inertia, it is reasonable to expect a larger learnability region when the
degree of technical trading in the foreign exchange market increases.
Sensitivity analysis Since a unique REE always is adaptively learnable,
we get the same general results when the index of openness of the economy
increases from δ =0 .2 to δ =0 .4 as when increasing the same index when we
investigated the conditions for determinacy.
3.2.2 Contemporaneous expectations in the Taylor rule
Let us continue with the contemporaneous expectations speciﬁcation of the
interest rate rule as it is presented in (2.10).
28First, using matrices and vectors, the model in (3.4) can be written as
follows
Ξ0 · yt = Π + Ξ1 · y
e
t + Σ · y
e
t+1 + Υ · rrt, (3.19)
where Ξ0 − Ξ1 = Ξ. Therefore, and guided by structure of the model’s MSV
solution, we assume that the PLM of the economy is
yt = b Θ + b Λ · rrt−1 + Φ · εt, (3.20)
from which we calculate the mathematically expected state of the economy in
the current time period
y
e
t = b Θ + b Λ · rrt−1, (3.21)
as well as in the next time period
y
e
t+1 = b Θ + b Λ · rr
e
t (3.22)
= b Θ + b Λ · ρrrt−1.
Recall that the dating of expectations in (3.21) is time period t−1.M o r e o v e r ,
to have an exact correspondence with Bullard and Mitra (2002), we assume
that the dating of expectations in (3.22) is also time period t−1. (Recall that
the dating of expectations when contemporaneous data are used in the Taylor
rule is time period t.)
Then, if we substitute the expected states of the economy in (3.21)—(3.22)
into the PLM of the economy in (3.20), we get the economy’s ALM
Ξ0 · yt = Π + Ξ1 ·
³





b Θ + b Λ · ρrrt−1
´
+ Υ · rrt
= Π + Ξ1 ·
³





b Θ + b Λ · ρrrt−1
´
+ Υ · (ρrrt−1 + εt),
or, if solved for the contemporaneous values of the model’s variables,
yt = Ξ
−1
0 · Π + Ξ
−1
0 · Ξ1 ·
³





0 · Σ ·
³
















Ξ1 · b Λ + Σ · b Λ · ρ + Υ · ρ
´
· rrt−1 + Ξ
−1
0 · Υ · εt.
Observe again that there is a mapping from the parameter values in the PLM































































where the equation’s ﬁx point is the MSV solution of the model in (3.19).
Hence, if the parameter vectors b Θ and b Λ are locally asymptotically stable
under (3.26), the MSV solution is E-stable, which is the case when all









/∂ b Θ = Ξ
−1






/∂b Λ = Ξ
−1
0 · (Ξ1 + Σ · ρ) − I
. (3.27)
Due to the fact that 0 ≤ ρ<1, we can limit our attention to the ﬁrst row in
(3.27), meaning that the relevant characteristic equation is
¯ ¯Ξ
−1
0 · (Ξ1 + Σ) − I − λl · I
¯ ¯ =0 , (3.28)
where λl is the eigenvalue (that has three solutions).
It turns out that the regions in the parameter space of (ω,ζx,ζπ,ζe)
for which we have a unique and an adaptively learnable inﬂation rate in
equilibrium are not the same as when a contemporaneous data speciﬁcation of
t h eT a y l o rr u l ei su s e db yt h em o n e t a r ya u t h o r i t y .S e eFigures 2—9.
























































Determinacy-learnable region (light area) for the contemporaneous expectations specification
of the Taylor rule when the output gap reaction is 0 and there is 25 percent chartism       
Figure 6
























































Determinacy-learnable region (light area) for the contemporaneous expectations specification
of the Taylor rule when the output gap reaction is 0 and there is 50 percent chartism       
Figure 7
























































Determinacy-learnable region (light area) for the contemporaneous expectations specification
of the Taylor rule when the output gap reaction is 0 and there is 75 percent chartism       
Figure 8
























































Determinacy-learnable region (light area) for the contemporaneous expectations specification
of the Taylor rule when the output gap reaction is 0 and there is 100 percent chartism      
Figure 9
To be more precise, the learnability regions are exactly the same for both
types of rules when ζx > 0, but slightly diﬀerent when ζx =0 . In the latter
case, the regions are slightly smaller when contemporaneous expectations of
the variables are used in the interest rate rule than when contemporaneous
data are used in the rule (eg, compare Figure 4a and Figure 8 as well as
Figure 5a and Figure 9). Since the determinacy regions for both types of
rules are exactly the same, this means that there are parametrizations of the
contemporaneous expectations speciﬁcation of the interest rate rule that give
rise to a unique REE that is not adaptively learnable. Note that a factor in
common for most of these parametrizations is that ζe > 0.
Sensitivity analysis When increasing the index of openness of the economy
from δ =0 .2 to δ =0 .4,n o n eo ft h eﬁndings are aﬀected. For both parameter
settings, this means that when at least half of the trade in the currency
market is driven by technical analysis, the learnability region increases when
the monetary authority reacts stronger to the output gap, whereas the opposite
is true when less than half of the trade is driven by chartism. Moreover, given
the output gap reaction in the Taylor rule, the learnability region gets larger
when the proportion of chartists in currency trade increases. Finally, when
ζx =0 , the learnability region is smaller when the economy is more open.
323.3 Robust and desirable Taylor rules
As already discussed in Section 1, our paper ﬁlls the gap between papers
that derive optimal policy rules in the new Keynesian framework and papers
that focus on determinacy and adaptive learnability of the REE in the same
framework. For this task, we use a loss-function as our metric that takes the
expected CPI inﬂation rate and the conditional volatility of the CPI inﬂation
rate in equilibrium as arguments.
Moreover, to ﬁnd robust parametrizations of the Taylor rules, the properties
of a rule should be relatively unaﬀected by the degree of technical trading in
the foreign exchange market. That is, the rule should give rise to determinacy,
adaptive learnability of the REE, and a desirable outcome according to the
loss-function for most proportions of chartism in currency trade.
3.3.1 Contemporaneous data in the Taylor rule
Starting with the contemporaneous data speciﬁcation of the interest rate rule
in (2.9), the expected CPI inﬂation rate in equilibrium is, according to the





−1 · Π +( I − Γ · ρ)
−1 · Ξ
−1 · Υ · Et (rrt)
¤
(2) , (3.29)
and the conditional volatility of the CPI inﬂation rate in equilibrium is
vart (πt)=
h¡















where (2) and (2,2) refer to the second element in the vector and the second
element along the diagonal in the matrix, respectively. Thereafter, substitute
the assumed values of the structural parameters and the exogenous variables
in the model into the expressions in (3.29)—(3.30). Thus, we make use of
the parameter values in (3.3) in the evaluation of the model’s outcome in
equilibrium.





t. In addition, we treat rrt as an exogenous variable. To make the
analysis as simple as possible, we set π∗
t = π
e,∗
t+1 =0 . Moreover, when the
variables in the Taylor rule are at their target values, i.e., xt = πt = ∆et =0
in (2.9), and the economy is in a stationary equilibrium, the domestic interest
rate is equal to the foreign interest rate due to the parity condition in (2.4) that
holds at the international asset market. Thus, the constant ζc in the Taylor
rule must be equal to the foreign interest rate. Finally, we set Et (rrt)=r∗
t,
because the natural rate of interest is, in a stationary equilibrium, equal to
the nominal interest rate due to the ﬁrst equation in (2.1), which, in turn, is
equal to the foreign interest rate due to the aforementioned parity condition.
The loss-function that we use as our metric to evaluate the desirability of
as p e c i ﬁcR E Ei sf o r m u l a t e da sf o l l o w s
L = H (|Et (πt)| − 0.01) + H
¡





33where H (·) is the Heaviside step function.9 Thus, the loss-function in (3.31)
is minimized and equal to 0 when the expected CPI inﬂation rate is within ±
0.01, and the conditional volatility of the CPI inﬂation rate is at most 0.2σ2
ε.
The motivation of the limits for a desirable inﬂation rate is that they are typical
in established inﬂation rate targeting regimes, whereas the choice of the limit
for the variability of the inﬂation rate is somewhat arbitrary. As an example
of an established inﬂation rate targeting regime, the Swedish Riksbank has
deﬁned price-stability as an increase in the CPI of two per cent, but with a
tolerance margin of plus/minus one percentage point around this target.
Typically, the loss-function in the optimal monetary policy literature may












where η is the relative weight placed by the monetary authority on the output
gap target. This type of loss-function is often called ﬂexible inﬂation rate
targeting (see Svensson, 1999), where η =0is strict inﬂation rate targeting,
but it can also be viewed as a quadratic approximation of the welfare function
of a representative household (see Woodford, 2003).
Since we, in this paper, disregard from reputational matters in monetary
p o l i c y ,w ed on o tt a k ei n t oa c c o u n tt h ef u t u r ep a t h sf o rt h ei n ﬂation rate and
the output gap when evaluating the outcome of monetary policy. Moreover,
we are interested in strict inﬂation rate targeting. Thus, our loss-function
in (3.31) diﬀers from the loss-function L = Et (π2
t) in two respects: (i) we
care about the two ﬁr s tm o m e n t so ft h ei n ﬂation rate; and (ii) in an inﬂation
rate targeting regime, we do not discriminate between an inﬂa t i o nr a t ea tt h e
middle of the band and an inﬂation rate that is within the band but not at
the middle. Of course, we could formulate the loss-function in (3.31) in more
general terms.
Needless to say, the interest rate set by the monetary authority must
be non-negative. Moreover, we are searching for robust and desirable
parametrizations of the Taylor rule in the sense that the desirable properties
of the rule should be relatively unaﬀected by the degree of technical trading
in the foreign exchange market, which implies that a robust parametrization
o ft h er u l es h o u l ds a t i s f yL =0for a range of values of ω. This is because the
exact proportion of chartists in currenc yt r a d ei sn o tk n o w nw h e nc o n d u c t i n g
monetary policy.
In Tables 1a—c, the degree of technical trading in the foreign exchange
market is 25, 35, 45, 55, 65, 75, 85 and 95 per cent, and the interest rate
abroad is 0.01, 0.02 and 0.03, respectively. Moreover, we are performing a grid
search for desirable parametrizations of the Taylor rule in which the parameter
values in the rule are whole numbers. (Throughout this section, the choices of
sets of ω in the grid search are to avoid matrices that are singular.)
9The Heaviside step function has the following property: H (x)=
½
1,x ≥ 0





The Taylor rules below satisfy the criteria, in terms of the expected CPI inflation rate in 
equilibrium and the conditional volatility of the CPI inflation rate in equilibrium, to be desirable 
rules. Moreover, the rules are associated with a unique equilibrium that is adaptively learnable in 
least squares sense, and the nominal interest rate in equilibrium is non-negative. 
 
The nominal interest rate abroad and the expected natural rate of interest are both equal to 0.01. 
Consequently, the constant in the Taylor rule is also 0.01. The index of openness of the economy 
is 0.2. 
 
Expected CPI inflation rate:  within +/- 0.01 
Conditional volatility of CPI inflation rate:  at most 0.2 times the conditional volatility of the 
stochastic process governing the natural rate of 
interest 
Unique and learnable equilibrium:  when 25, 35, 45, 55, 65, 75, 85 and 95 per cent 
chartism in currency trade 
 
The parameter values in the rules are whole numbers. 
 
 
Parameter values in 
the Taylor rule 
Nominal interest rate  Expected CPI 
inflation rate 
Conditional 
volatility of CPI 
inflation rate 
      
(output gap, inflation rate, exchange rate change, per cent chartism) 
      
(0, 8, -2, 95)  0.0014  -0.0032  0.0262 
(0, 8, -2, 25)  0.0020  -0.0019  0.0861 
      
(0, 9, -2, 95)  0.0025  -0.0025  0.0232 
(0, 9, -2, 25)  0.0033  -0.0011  0.0838 
      
(0, 10, -3, 95)  7.5059e-4  -0.0037  0.0280 
(0, 10, -3, 25)  9.9770e-4  -0.0024  0.0881 
(0, 10, -3, 15)
1 0.0011  -0.0019  0.1156 
      
(0, 10, -4, 95)  7.5506e-4  -0.0067  0.0064 
(0, 10, -4, 25)  0.0010  -0.0047  0.0785 
 







The Taylor rules below satisfy the criteria, in terms of the expected CPI inflation rate in 
equilibrium and the conditional volatility of the CPI inflation rate in equilibrium, to be desirable 
rules. Moreover, the rules are associated with a unique equilibrium that is adaptively learnable in 
least squares sense, and the nominal interest rate in equilibrium is non-negative. 
 
The nominal interest rate abroad and the expected natural rate of interest are both equal to 0.02. 
Consequently, the constant in the Taylor rule is also 0.02. The index of openness of the economy 
is 0.2. 
 
Expected CPI inflation rate:  within +/- 0.01 
Conditional volatility of CPI inflation rate:  at most 0.2 times the conditional volatility of the 
stochastic process governing the natural rate of 
interest 
Unique and learnable equilibrium:  when 25, 35, 45, 55, 65, 75, 85 and 95 per cent 
chartism in currency trade 
 
The parameter values in the rules are whole numbers. 
 
 
Parameter values in 
the Taylor rule 
Nominal interest rate  Expected CPI 
inflation rate 
Conditional 
volatility of CPI 
inflation rate 
      
(output gap, inflation rate, exchange rate change, per cent chartism) 
      
(0, 8, -2, 95)  0.0028  -0.0064  0.0262 
(0, 8, -2, 25)  0.0040  -0.0037  0.0861 
      
(0, 9, -2, 95)  0.0049  -0.0050  0.0232 
(0, 9, -2, 25)  0.0066  -0.0022  0.0838 
      
(0, 10, -3, 95)  0.0015  -0.0073  0.0280 
(0, 10, -3, 25)  0.0020  -0.0047  0.0881 
(0, 10, -3, 15)
1 0.0022  -0.0039  0.1156 
 







The Taylor rules below satisfy the criteria, in terms of the expected CPI inflation rate in 
equilibrium and the conditional volatility of the CPI inflation rate in equilibrium, to be desirable 
rules. Moreover, the rules are associated with a unique equilibrium that is adaptively learnable in 
least squares sense, and the nominal interest rate in equilibrium is non-negative. 
 
The nominal interest rate abroad and the expected natural rate of interest are both equal to 0.03. 
Consequently, the constant in the Taylor rule is also 0.03. The index of openness of the economy 
is 0.2. 
 
Expected CPI inflation rate:  within +/- 0.01 
Conditional volatility of CPI inflation rate:  at most 0.2 times the conditional volatility of the 
stochastic process governing the natural rate of 
interest 
Unique and learnable equilibrium:  when 25, 35, 45, 55, 65, 75, 85 and 95 per cent 
chartism in currency trade 
 
The parameter values in the rules are whole numbers. 
 
 
Parameter values in 
the Taylor rule 
Nominal interest rate  Expected CPI 
inflation rate 
Conditional 
volatility of CPI 
inflation rate 
      
(output gap, inflation rate, exchange rate change, per cent chartism) 
      
(0, 8, -2, 95)  0.0043  -0.0095  0.0262 
(0, 8, -2, 25)  0.0060  -0.0056  0.0861 
      
(0, 9, -2, 95)  0.0074  -0.0074  0.0232 
(0, 9, -2, 25)  0.0099  -0.0033  0.0838 
 
 Two results are found in the tables: (i) the monetary authority should increase
(decrease) the interest rate when the CPI inﬂation rate increases (decreases)
and when the currency gets stronger (weaker), but not care about the output
gap, to have a desirable rule that also is robust; and (ii) the number of interest
rate rules with these properties decreases with increases in the foreign interest
rate.
In Tables 2a—c, we have repeated the same procedure with the exception
that the parameter ζe in the Taylor rule is restricted to 0. As a consequence,
the proportion of chartists in currency trade is limited to 55, 65, 75, 85 and
95 per cent since there are no desirable parametrizations of the rule when the
proportion is 45 per cent or lower, having restricted the parameter values in
the interest rate rule to whole numbers.
As before, the number of desirable interest rate rules that are robust
decreases with increases in the foreign interest rate. Further on, which is
true irrespective of whether the parameter ζe in the Taylor rule is restricted
to 0 or not, the monetary authority should react strongly to changes in the
inﬂation rate to have an outcome that is desirable in terms of the expected
inﬂation rate and the conditional volatility of the inﬂation rate in equilibrium.
In Tables 3a—c, the grid search for desirable Taylor rules has been reﬁned
in the sense that the parameter values in the rules are multiples of 0.1.T h i s
also means that we restrict the presentation to the share of rules that satisfy
L =0for diﬀerent sets of ω.
Three results are found in the tables: (i) the number of desirable rules
decreases when the range of values of ω increases, and irrespective of whether
the value of ζe is restricted to 0 or not; (ii) the number of robust and desirable
rules decreases with increases in the foreign interest rate, and also irrespective
of the value of ζe (as also noted above); and (iii) the number of rules that give
rise to a unique and adaptively learnable REE, but not restricted to L =0 ,
decreases when the range of values of ω increases. Of course, that the share of
rules that are associated with determinacy and learnability is not aﬀected by
the foreign interest rate is not surprising since this variable is not part of the
coeﬃcient matrix in (3.2).
But, then, which parametrization of the Taylor rule is the best rule? When
the interest rate abroad is 0.01 and 0.02, respectively, it is the same 16 rules
that satisfy L =0for the set of ω that includes 5, 15, 25, 35, 45, 55, 65, 75, 85
and 95 per cent chartism in currency trade. Of these 16 parametrizations of
the interest rate rule, the following rule is desirable down to 2 percent technical
trading in the foreign exchange market
rt = r
∗
t +9 .9πt − 3.2∆et. (3.33)
The Taylor rule in (3.33) fails to be desirable when the interest rate abroad is
0.03, and this is because the expected inﬂation rate is not within ± 0.01 when a
large proportion of currency trade is driven by technical analysis. Concerning
the other 15 parametrizations of the interest rate rule, the parameters belong
to the sets ζx ∈ [0,0.1], ζπ ∈ [9.2,10] and ζe ∈ [−3.4,−2.9]. Thus, in principle,
the monetary authority should not care about the output gap when setting the





The Taylor rules below satisfy the criteria, in terms of the expected CPI inflation rate in 
equilibrium and the conditional volatility of the CPI inflation rate in equilibrium, to be desirable 
rules. Moreover, the rules are associated with a unique equilibrium that is adaptively learnable in 
least squares sense, and the nominal interest rate in equilibrium is non-negative. 
 
The nominal interest rate abroad and the expected natural rate of interest are both equal to 0.01. 
Consequently, the constant in the Taylor rule is also 0.01. The index of openness of the economy 
is 0.2. 
 
Expected CPI inflation rate:  within +/- 0.01 
Conditional volatility of CPI inflation rate:  at most 0.2 times the conditional volatility of the 
stochastic process governing the natural rate of 
interest 




The parameter values in the rules are whole numbers. Finally, since there are 37 rules that satisfy 




Parameter values in 
the Taylor rule 
Nominal interest rate  Expected CPI 
inflation rate 
Conditional 
volatility of CPI 
inflation rate 
      
(output gap, inflation rate, exchange rate change, per cent chartism) 
      
(1, 8, 0, 95)  0.0085  -9.2669e-4  6.9865e-4 
(1, 8, 0, 55)  0.0092  -1.0997e-4  0.0117 
      
(1, 9, 0, 95)  0.0086  -7.9084e-4  6.6905e-4 
(1, 9, 0, 55)  0.0094  1.4530e-5  0.0113 
      
(2, 8, 0, 95)  0.0086  -0.0010  3.8413e-4 
(2, 8, 0, 55)  0.0092  -1.5080e-4  0.0117 
      
(2, 9, 0, 95)  0.0087  -9.0074e-4  3.7480e-4 
(2, 9, 0, 55)  0.0093  -2.0571e-5  0.0115 
      
(2, 10, 0, 95)  0.0088  -7.9179e-4  3.6582e-4 
(2, 10, 0, 55)  0.0095  8.1409e-5  0.0113 
      
(3, 8, 0, 95)  0.0086  -0.0011  2.8590e-4 
(3, 8, 0, 55)  0.0091  -1.8865e-4  0.0118 
      
(3, 9, 0, 95)  0.0088  -9.6749e-4  2.8104e-4 
(3, 9, 0, 55)  0.0093  -5.7619e-5  0.0116 
      
(3, 10, 0, 95)  0.0089  -8.5817e-4  2.7630e-4 
(3, 10, 0, 55)  0.0094  4.6640e-5  0.0115 
      
(4, 9, 0, 95)  0.0087  -0.0010  2.3618e-4 
(4, 9, 0, 55)  0.0092  -9.2913e-5  0.0117 
      
(4, 10, 0, 95)  0.0089  -9.0982e-4  2.3311e-4 
(4, 10, 0, 55)  0.0094  1.2024e-5  0.0115 
 





The Taylor rules below satisfy the criteria, in terms of the expected CPI inflation rate in 
equilibrium and the conditional volatility of the CPI inflation rate in equilibrium, to be desirable 
rules. Moreover, the rules are associated with a unique equilibrium that is adaptively learnable in 
least squares sense, and the nominal interest rate in equilibrium is non-negative. 
 
The nominal interest rate abroad and the expected natural rate of interest are both equal to 0.02. 
Consequently, the constant in the Taylor rule is also 0.02. The index of openness of the economy 
is 0.2. 
 
Expected CPI inflation rate:  within +/- 0.01 
Conditional volatility of CPI inflation rate:  at most 0.2 times the conditional volatility of the 
stochastic process governing the natural rate of 
interest 




The parameter values in the rules are whole numbers. Finally, since there are 33 rules that satisfy 




Parameter values in 
the Taylor rule 
Nominal interest rate  Expected CPI 
inflation rate 
Conditional 
volatility of CPI 
inflation rate 
      
(output gap, inflation rate, exchange rate change, per cent chartism) 
      
(1, 8, 0, 95)  0.0169  -0.0019  6.9865e-4 
(1, 8, 0, 55)  0.0184  -2.1994e-4  0.0117 
      
(1, 9, 0, 95)  0.0172  -0.0016  6.6905e-4 
(1, 9, 0, 55)  0.0188  2.9060e-5  0.0113 
      
(2, 8, 0, 95)  0.0172  -0.0021  3.8413e-4 
(2, 8, 0, 55)  0.0183  -3.0160e-4  0.0117 
      
(2, 9, 0, 95)  0.0175  -0.0018  3.7480e-4 
(2, 9, 0, 55)  0.0187  -4.1142e-5  0.0115 
      
(2, 10, 0, 95)  0.0177  -0.0016  3.6582e-4 
(2, 10, 0, 55)  0.0190  1.6282e-4  0.0113 
      
(3, 8, 0, 95)  0.0172  -0.0022  2.8590e-4 
(3, 8, 0, 55)  0.0182  -3.7729e-4  0.0118 
      
(3, 9, 0, 95)  0.0175  -0.0019  2.8104e-4 
(3, 9, 0, 55)  0.0186  -1.1524e-4  0.0116 
      
(3, 10, 0, 95)  0.0177  -0.0017  2.7630e-4 
(3, 10, 0, 55)  0.0188  9.3280e-5  0.0115 
      
(4, 9, 0, 95)  0.0175  -0.0020  2.3618e-4 
(4, 9, 0, 55)  0.0185  -1.8583e-4  0.0117 
      
(4, 10, 0, 95)  0.0177  -0.0018  2.3311e-4 
(4, 10, 0, 55)  0.0187  2.4048e-5  0.0115 
 





The Taylor rules below satisfy the criteria, in terms of the expected CPI inflation rate in 
equilibrium and the conditional volatility of the CPI inflation rate in equilibrium, to be desirable 
rules. Moreover, the rules are associated with a unique equilibrium that is adaptively learnable in 
least squares sense, and the nominal interest rate in equilibrium is non-negative. 
 
The nominal interest rate abroad and the expected natural rate of interest are both equal to 0.03. 
Consequently, the constant in the Taylor rule is also 0.03. The index of openness of the economy 
is 0.2. 
 
Expected CPI inflation rate:  within +/- 0.01 
Conditional volatility of CPI inflation rate:  at most 0.2 times the conditional volatility of the 
stochastic process governing the natural rate of 
interest 




The parameter values in the rules are whole numbers. Finally, since there are 30 rules that satisfy 




Parameter values in 
the Taylor rule 
Nominal interest rate  Expected CPI 
inflation rate 
Conditional 
volatility of CPI 
inflation rate 
      
(output gap, inflation rate, exchange rate change, per cent chartism) 
      
(1, 8, 0, 95)  0.0254  -0.0028  6.9865e-4 
(1, 8, 0, 55)  0.0276  -3.2991e-4  0.0117 
      
(1, 9, 0, 95)  0.0258  -0.0024  6.6905e-4 
(1, 9, 0, 55)  0.0282  4.3591e-5  0.0113 
      
(2, 8, 0, 95)  0.0257  -0.0031  3.8413e-4 
(2, 8, 0, 55)  0.0275  -4.5240e-4  0.0117 
      
(2, 9, 0, 95)  0.0262  -0.0027  3.7480e-4 
(2, 9, 0, 55)  0.0280  -6.1713e-5  0.0115 
      
(2, 10, 0, 95)  0.0265  -0.0024  3.6582e-4 
(2, 10, 0, 55)  0.0284  2.4423e-4  0.0113 
      
(3, 8, 0, 95)  0.0258  -0.0033  2.8590e-4 
(3, 8, 0, 55)  0.0273  -5.6594e-4  0.0118 
      
(3, 9, 0, 95)  0.0263  -0.0029  2.8104e-4 
(3, 9, 0, 55)  0.0278  -1.7286e-4  0.0116 
      
(3, 10, 0, 95)  0.0266  -0.0026  2.7630e-4 
(3, 10, 0, 55)  0.0282  1.3992e-4  0.0115 
      
(4, 9, 0, 95)  0.0262  -0.0031  2.3618e-4 
(4, 9, 0, 55)  0.0277  -2.7874e-4  0.0117 
      
(4, 10, 0, 95)  0.0266  -0.0027  2.3311e-4 
(4, 10, 0, 55)  0.0281  3.6072e-5  0.0115 
 





The number of Taylor rules that satisfy the criteria, in terms of the expected CPI inflation rate in 
equilibrium and the conditional volatility of the CPI inflation rate in equilibrium, to be desirable 
rules. Moreover, the rules are associated with a unique equilibrium that is adaptively learnable in 
least squares sense, and the nominal interest rate in equilibrium is non-negative. 
 
The nominal interest rate abroad and the expected natural rate of interest are both equal to 0.01. 
Consequently, the constant in the Taylor rule is also 0.01. The index of openness of the economy 
is 0.2. 
 
Expected CPI inflation rate:  within +/- 0.01 
Conditional volatility of CPI inflation rate:  at most 0.2 times the conditional volatility of the 
stochastic process governing the natural rate of 
interest 
 
The parameter values in the rules are multiples of 0.1. 
 
Unique and learnable equilibrium:  when 5, 15, 25, 35, 45, 55, 65, 75, 85 and 95 per cent 
chartism in currency trade 
Number of rules with a unique and learnable 
equilibrium: 
 
7 122 out of 418 241, ie, 1.7028 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules:  16 out of 418 241, ie, 0.0038 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules when no exchange 
rate change reaction: 
 
0 out of 4 141 
  
Unique and learnable equilibrium:  when 15, 25, 35, 45, 55, 65, 75, 85 and 95 percent 
chartism in currency trade 
Number of rules with a unique and learnable 
equilibrium: 
 
12 790 out of 418 241, ie, 3.0580 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules:  404 out of 418 241, ie, 0.0966 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules when no exchange 
rate change reaction: 
 
0 out of 4 141 
  
Unique and learnable equilibrium:  when 25, 35, 45, 55, 65, 75, 85 and 95 per cent 
chartism in currency trade 
Number of rules with a unique and learnable 
equilibrium: 
 
25 591 out of 418 241, ie, 6.1187 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules:  2 482 out of 418 241, ie, 0.5934 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules when no exchange 
rate change reaction: 
 
0 out of 4 141 
  
Unique and learnable equilibrium:  when 35, 45, 55, 65, 75, 85 and 95 per cent chartism in 
currency trade 
Number of rules with a unique and learnable 
equilibrium: 
 
65 085 out of 418 241, ie, 15.5616 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules:  14 669 out of 418 241, ie, 3.5073 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules when no exchange 
rate change reaction: 
 
0 out of 4 141 
  
Unique and learnable equilibrium:  when 45, 55, 65, 75, 85 and 95 per cent chartism in 
currency trade 
Number of rules with a unique and learnable 
equilibrium: 
128 699 out of 418 241, ie, 30.7715 per cent of the 
rules 
Number of desirable rules:  60 574 out of 418 241, ie, 14.4830 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules when no exchange 
rate change reaction: 
 
1 out of 4 141, ie, 0.0241 per cent of the rules 
  
Unique and learnable equilibrium:  when 55, 65, 75, 85 and 95 percent chartism in 
currency trade 
Number of rules with a unique and learnable 
equilibrium: 
199 165 out of 418 241, ie, 47.6197 percent of the 
rules 
Number of desirable rules:  129 365 out of 418 241, ie, 30.9307 percent of the 
rules 
Number of desirable rules when no exchange 
rate change reaction: 
 





The number of Taylor rules that satisfy the criteria, in terms of the expected CPI inflation rate in 
equilibrium and the conditional volatility of the CPI inflation rate in equilibrium, to be desirable 
rules. Moreover, the rules are associated with a unique equilibrium that is adaptively learnable in 
least squares sense, and the nominal interest rate in equilibrium is non-negative. 
 
The nominal interest rate abroad and the expected natural rate of interest are both equal to 0.02. 
Consequently, the constant in the Taylor rule is also 0.02. The index of openness of the economy 
is 0.2. 
 
Expected CPI inflation rate:  within +/- 0.01 
Conditional volatility of CPI inflation rate:  at most 0.2 times the conditional volatility of the 
stochastic process governing the natural rate of 
interest 
 
The parameter values in the rules are multiples of 0.1. 
 
Unique and learnable equilibrium:  when 5, 15, 25, 35, 45, 55, 65, 75, 85 and 95 per cent 
chartism in currency trade 
Number of rules with a unique and learnable 
equilibrium: 
 
7 122 out of 418 241, ie, 1.7028 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules:  16 out of 418 241, ie, 0.0038 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules when no exchange 
rate change reaction: 
 
0 out of 4 141 
  
Unique and learnable equilibrium:  when 15, 25, 35, 45, 55, 65, 75, 85 and 95 percent 
chartism in currency trade 
Number of rules with a unique and learnable 
equilibrium: 
 
12 790 out of 418 241, ie, 3.0580 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules:  241 out of 418 241, ie, 0.0576 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules when no exchange 
rate change reaction: 
 
0 out of 4 141 
  
Unique and learnable equilibrium:  when 25, 35, 45, 55, 65, 75, 85 and 95 per cent 
chartism in currency trade 
Number of rules with a unique and learnable 
equilibrium: 
 
25 591 out of 418 241, ie, 6.1187 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules:  1 034 out of 418 241, ie, 0.2472 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules when no exchange 
rate change reaction: 
 
0 out of 4 141 
  
Unique and learnable equilibrium:  when 35, 45, 55, 65, 75, 85 and 95 per cent chartism in 
currency trade 
Number of rules with a unique and learnable 
equilibrium: 
 
65 085 out of 418 241, ie, 15.5616 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules:  4 234 out of 418 241, ie, 1.0123 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules when no exchange 
rate change reaction: 
 
0 out of 4 141 
  
Unique and learnable equilibrium:  when 45, 55, 65, 75, 85 and 95 per cent chartism in 
currency trade 
Number of rules with a unique and learnable 
equilibrium: 
128 699 out of 418 241, ie, 30.7715 per cent of the 
rules 
Number of desirable rules:  32 809 out of 418 241, ie, 7.8445 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules when no exchange 
rate change reaction: 
 
0 out of 4 141 
  
Unique and learnable equilibrium:  when 55, 65, 75, 85 and 95 per cent chartism in 
currency trade 
Number of rules with a unique and learnable 
equilibrium: 
199 165 out of 418 241, ie, 47.6197 per cent of the 
rules 
Number of desirable rules:  99 213 out of 418 241, ie, 23.7215 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules when no exchange 
rate change reaction: 
 






The number of Taylor rules that satisfy the criteria, in terms of the expected CPI inflation rate in 
equilibrium and the conditional volatility of the CPI inflation rate in equilibrium, to be desirable 
rules. Moreover, the rules are associated with a unique equilibrium that is adaptively learnable in 
least squares sense, and the nominal interest rate in equilibrium is non-negative. 
 
The nominal interest rate abroad and the expected natural rate of interest are both equal to 0.03. 
Consequently, the constant in the Taylor rule is also 0.03. The index of openness of the economy 
is 0.2. 
 
Expected CPI inflation rate:  within +/- 0.01 
Conditional volatility of CPI inflation rate:  at most 0.2 times the conditional volatility of the 
stochastic process governing the natural rate of 
interest 
 
The parameter values in the rules are multiples of 0.1. 
 
Unique and learnable equilibrium:  when 5, 15, 25, 35, 45, 55, 65, 75, 85 and 95 per cent 
chartism in currency trade 
Number of rules with a unique and learnable 
equilibrium: 
 
7 122 out of 418 241, ie, 1.7028 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules:  0 out of 418 241 
Number of desirable rules when no exchange 
rate change reaction: 
 
0 out of 4 141 
  
Unique and learnable equilibrium:  when 15, 25, 35, 45, 55, 65, 75, 85 and 95 percent 
chartism in currency trade 
Number of rules with a unique and learnable 
equilibrium: 
 
12 790 out of 418 241, ie, 3.0580 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules:  16 out of 418 241, ie, 0.0038 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules when no exchange 
rate change reaction: 
 
0 out of 4 141 
  
Unique and learnable equilibrium:  when 25, 35, 45, 55, 65, 75, 85 and 95 per cent 
chartism in currency trade 
Number of rules with a unique and learnable 
equilibrium: 
 
25 591 out of 418 241, ie, 6.1187 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules:  175 out of 418 241, ie, 0.0418 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules when no exchange 
rate change reaction: 
 
0 out of 4 141 
  
Unique and learnable equilibrium:  when 35, 45, 55, 65, 75, 85 and 95 per cent chartism in 
currency trade 
Number of rules with a unique and learnable 
equilibrium: 
 
65 085 out of 418 241, ie, 15.5616 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules:  949 out of 418 241, ie, 0.2269 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules when no exchange 
rate change reaction: 
 
0 out of 4 141 
  
Unique and learnable equilibrium:  when 45, 55, 65, 75, 85 and 95 per cent chartism in 
currency trade 
Number of rules with a unique and learnable 
equilibrium: 
128 699 out of 418 241, ie, 30.7715 per cent of the 
rules 
Number of desirable rules:  14 528 out of 418 241, ie, 3.4736 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules when no exchange 
rate change reaction: 
 
0 out of 4 141 
  
Unique and learnable equilibrium:  when 55, 65, 75, 85 and 95 per cent chartism in 
currency trade 
Number of rules with a unique and learnable 
equilibrium: 
199 165 out of 418 241, ie, 47.6197 per cent of the 
rules 
Number of desirable rules:  77 188 out of 418 241, ie, 18.4554 per cent of the rules 
Number of desirable rules when no exchange 
rate change reaction: 
 
2 481 out of 4 141, ie, 59.9131 per cent of the rules 
 
 Sensitivity analysis We have again performed a sensitivity analysis of the
numerical ﬁndings in which the index of openness of the economy has been
increased from δ =0 .2 to δ =0 .4.B a s i c a l l y , t h e ﬁndings that we reported
when this index was equal to 0.2 are not aﬀected. However, in comparison,
the share of rules that give rise to a unique and adaptively learnable REE is
larger when the smallest proportions of chartism in currency trade is excluded
in the grid search, whereas the opposite is true when the smallest proportions
of technical trading is included. We also found the same results in our search
for desirable parametrizations of the Taylor rule.
3.3.2 Contemporaneous expectations in the Taylor rule
Continuing with the contemporaneous expectations speciﬁcation of the interest
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Except for a diﬀerence in the dating of expectations, the expected CPI inﬂation
rate in equilibrium in (3.34) is the same as in (3.29). This means that it
does not matter if contemporaneous data are used in the Taylor rule or if
contemporaneous expectations, formed in the previous time period, of the
variables are used in the Taylor rule, the expected CPI inﬂation rate in
equilibrium is exactly the same.
Even though the conditional volatility of the CPI inﬂation rate in
equilibrium in (3.35) is not the same as in (3.30), there is a linear relationship
between them. To be more precise, the former quantity can be written
as ρ2σ2
π + α2γ (1 − δ)σ2
ε =0 .1225σ2
π +0 .77894σ2
ε,w h e r eσ2
π is the latter
quantity, and where we have substituted the parameter values in (3.3) into
the expression.11 This means that the ordering from the best interest rate rule
to the worst rule is the same, irrespective of whether the speciﬁcation of the
rule includes contemporaneous data or contemporaneous expectations of the
included variables.
However, none of the parametrizations of the Taylor rule are satisfactory
from the point of view of the variability of the CPI inﬂation rate. This is
because the conditional volatility of the CPI inﬂation rate in equilibrium always
is larger than (the somewhat arbitrary limit) 0.2σ2
ε. Speciﬁcally, the variability
10See the Appendix for the derivations of (3.34)—(3.35).
11See the Appendix for the derivation of this result.
45of the CPI inﬂation rate can never be below 0.77894σ2
ε. Of course, this
does not mean that one should never adopt a contemporaneous expectations
speciﬁcation of the Taylor rule in monetary policy-making. The reason is that
it may be the case that the contemporaneous data speciﬁcation of the Taylor
rule is not accessible due to data revisions. Consequently, one is forced to use
a rule that includes contemporaneous expectations of the variables, which also
means that one must accept a higher conditional volatility of the CPI inﬂation
rate in equilibrium.
Sensitivity analysis Obviously, the ordering of the Taylor rules are not
aﬀected when the index of openness of the economy increases from δ =0 .2 to
δ =0 .4. It is also still true that none of the parametrizations of the Taylor rule
are satisfactory from the point of view of the variability of the CPI inﬂation




W ed on o tr e p e a to u rﬁndings in this discussion. Instead, we conclude with a
few remarks on the model developed and shortly discuss the claims in Taylor
(2001) that the monetary authority’s interest rate rule should not include a
reaction to an exchange rate index to be favorable, which is in contrast with
our ﬁnding.
Our model Firstly, a few words about the technical trading technique in
(2.6) are in place. It is clear that questionnaire surveys made at currency
markets around the world not only conﬁrm that chartism is extensively used
in currency trade, but they also conﬁrm that some variant of a moving average
technique is the most commonly used technical trading technique. This means
that exchange rates in the more distant past also should aﬀect the decision to
trade, and not only the exchange rates in time periods t and t − 1.T h u s ,a
model with bounded memory could be in place (see Honkapohja and Mitra,
2003; for adaptive learning with bounded memory).
In Bask (2006), an asset pricing model for the exchange rate is developed in
which the current rate is aﬀected by an exponentially weighted moving average
of all past exchange rates. When analyzing the eﬀects of changes in monetary
fundamentals, it is clear that the exchange rate in time period t − 1 has a
ﬁrst-order eﬀect on the current rate, while rates in the more distant past have
a second-order eﬀect on the current exchange rate. Encouraged be this ﬁnding,
we restricted the technique in (2.6) to only include the exchange rates in time
periods t and t − 1. An advantage of this restriction is that the complete
model would, otherwise, be too cumbersome to analyze, even numerically.
This is because we would have to work with extremely large matrixes when
investigating if a certain parametrization of a Taylor rule is associated with a
unique, adaptively learnable and desirable inﬂation rate in equilibrium.
Secondly, we could formulate the interest rate rules in (2.9)—(2.10) in terms
of the level of the nominal exchange rate; the actual level of the exchange rate
in (2.9), and the mathematically expected level of the exchange rate in (2.10).
46However, having in mind that there have been several monetary arrangements
throughout history aiming at achieving less variable exchange rates, we stick
with the formulations of the interest rate rules in (2.9)—(2.10) and focus on the
change in the nominal exchange rate. Of course, it is part of future research to
search for robust and desirable parametrizations of the Taylor rules that take
current and past levels of the exchange rate as arguments.
Thirdly, the dating of expectations might be important for the ﬁndings in
this paper. Recall that when contemporaneous data are used in the Taylor
rule as in (2.9), the dating of expectations is time period t,w h e r e a sw h e n
contemporaneous expectations of the variables are used in the Taylor rule as
in (2.10), the dating of expectations is time period t − 1. As was explained
in Section 3.2.2, the reason for the latter assumption is that we would like to
have an exact correspondence with Bullard and Mitra (2002). For the same
reason, one should also investigate the case when the Taylor rule is (2.9) and
the dating of expectations is time period t − 1. In Bullard and Mitra (2002),
the ﬁndings are not aﬀected by this change of dating of expectations.
Finally, the recursive least squares learning algorithm that is used by
the fundamentalists is a decreasing gain algorithm. It would, therefore,
be interesting to complement the analysis in this paper with the case in
which the learning algorithm is a constant gain algorithm, especially when
the fundamentalists, including the monetary authority, is using a PLM of
the economy that does not include any REE. This is because it might open
up for so-called escape dynamics in the inﬂation rate from a self-conﬁrming
equilibrium (see, eg, Cho et al, 2002, and Williams, 2004, for an introduction
to this recent literature, Bullard and Cho, 2005, for an example of escape
dynamics in a closed economy like the one in Bullard and Mitra, 2002),
and Milani (2006) for an example in which the constant gain parameter is
estimated).
Taylor’s (2001) claim he vigilant reader might object that we, in this
paper, are not really meeting the claim in Taylor (2001). This is because we
investigate the properties of the model developed using speciﬁcations of the
Taylor rule that include the change in the nominal exchange rate, while Taylor
(2001) is discussing interest rate rules that include the current and past levels
of the real exchange rate. To be more speciﬁc, Taylor (2001) is discussing the
following rule
rt = ζc + ζxxt + ζππt + ζqqt + ζq0qt−1, (4.1)
where qt is the real exchange rate.
In fact, the investigation in this paper is adequate, and there are two reasons
for this. Firstly, by assuming that ζq0 = −ζq, we turn our focus from levels
o ft h er e a le x c h a n g er a t et ot h ec h a n g ei nt h er e a le x c h a n g er a t e . T h i sa l s o
means, since the real exchange rate is qt = et + p∗
t − pt,w h e r ept is the CPI,
that the Taylor rule in (4.1) can be written as follows:




πt + ζq∆et + ζqπ
∗
t. (4.2)
Secondly, since we assume that π∗
t =0in the numerical analysis, the interest
rate rule in (4.2) is, in principle, exactly the same as the rule in (2.9). Note
47that the assumption ζq0 = −ζq is necessary to transform the Taylor rule in
(4.1) to the rule in (4.2).
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Derivation of (2.3)



















































· (πt − δ(∆et + π
∗
t)). (A.4)
Fifthly, substitute (A.3) into the ﬁrst equation in (2.1), and the ﬁrst equation
in (2.3) is derived. Finally, substitute (A.3)—(A.4) into the second equation in
(2.1), solve for πt, and the second equation in (2.3) is derived.
Derivation of (3.1) Firstly, substitute aggregated expectations at the foreign
exchange market in (2.8) and the Taylor rule in (2.9) into the dynamic IS-type
equation in (2.3), and rearrange terms


























Secondly, substitute aggregated expectations at the foreign exchange market
in (2.8) into the new Keynesian Phillips curve in (2.3), and rearrange terms
γ (δ − 1)xt + πt + δ(βω − 1)∆et (A.6)
= βπ
e







Thirdly, substitute aggregated expectations at the foreign exchange market in
(2.8) and the Taylor rule in (2.9) into the UIP condition in (2.4), and rearrange
terms
ζxxt + ζππt +( ζe − ω)∆et =( 1− ω)∆e
e
t+1 − ζc + r
∗
t. (A.7)
Finally, put (A.5)—(A.7) into matrix form, and (3.1) is derived.
52Derivation of (3.4) Firstly, substitute aggregated expectations at the foreign
e x c h a n g em a r k e ti n( 2 . 8 )a n dt h eT a y l o rr u l ei n( 2 . 1 0 )i n t ot h ed y n a m i cI S - t y p e































Secondly, substitute aggregated expectations at the foreign exchange market








t +( 1− ω)∆e
e
t+1 − ζc + r
∗
t. (A.9)
Finally, put (A.6) and (A.8)—(A.9) into matrix form, and (3.4) is derived. Note
that (A.6) is unaﬀe c t e db yt h et y p eo fT a y l o rr u l et h a ti su s e db yt h em o n e t a r y
authority.
Derivation of (3.2) when the Taylor rule is (2.10) Substitute (3.5) into
(3.4), and note that the coeﬃcient matrix for the vector [xt,πt,∆et]
0 at the
























γ (δ − 1) 1 δ(βω − 1)
ζx ζπ ζe − ω
⎤
⎦,
which is the same coeﬃcient matrix for the vector [xt,πt,∆et]
0 at the left-hand
side of (3.1). Consequently, the relevant coeﬃcient matrix when deriving the
conditions for determinacy is (3.2).
Derivations of (3.34)—(3.35) The ﬁx point in (3.26) is the MSV solution








Π + Ξ1 · b Θ + Σ · b Θ
´




Ξ1 · b Λ + Σ · b Λ · ρ + Υ · ρ
´ (A.11)
which means that the MSV solution is
yt = b Θ + b Λ · rrt−1 + Φ · εt (A.12)
=( I − Γ)
−1 · Ξ
−1 · Π +
(I − Γ · ρ)
−1 · Ξ
−1 · Υ · ρrrt−1 + Ξ
−1
0 · Υ · εt
53where Φ = Ξ
−1
0 ·Υ follows from comparing the PLM in (3.20) with the ALM in
(3.24) since the PLM of the economy is guided by the structure of the model’s
MSV solution. Recall that Γ = Ξ−1 · Σ and Ξ0 − Ξ1 = Ξ. Thereafter, take
the conditional expectations and volatility of (A.12), note that Et−1 (ρrrt−1)=
Et−1 (rrt) due to the stochastic process for the natural rate of interest in (2.5),
and (3.34)—(3.35) follows.
Derivation of the relationship between (3.30) and (3.35) Since
Ξ
−1























































































2γ (1 − δ),
and the postulated linear relationship between (3.30) and (3.35) follows.
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